Another 20 years? 30? 50?

Other nations have managed to construct high-speed rail lines. 

Not California, though. It’s embarrassing.

Ian Choudri, chief executive of the California High-Speed Rail Authority since 2024, resigned October 28 amid a spending scandal. His agency is supposed to deliver the bullet-train connection between San Francisco and Los Angeles that California voters approved funding for way back in 2008. 

Eighteen years (and billions of dollars over budget) later, its railway still carries no passengers.

His resignation followed findings of nearly $600,000 in improper consultant travel expenses, including trips involving a nightclub, cigar lounge and an escape room. The board had already restricted his contracting authority. Choudri cited personal and family priorities in his resignation letter. 

Whatever his explanation, this was a departure under disgraceful circumstances for an agency entrusted with public money.

Nor should Californians confuse his exit with a turnaround. Another executive will inherit the office with no incentive to change the machinery that produced the failure.

The warnings go back more than a decade. Internal audits in 2015 and 2016 identified weak contract management, insufficient expertise and uncertainty about whether approved invoices represented appropriate services. In 2018, California’s state auditor documented rules that existed on paper without adequate enforcement.

Then, 56 contract managers oversaw 204 contracts worth $5.6 billion. Only three performed contract management full time. Consultants had become the effective managers of important contracting functions. Missing documentation prevented auditors from establishing whether hundreds of millions spent on selected contracts had been necessary or appropriate. information.

But sure, nothing to see here.

Construction also began before sufficient land, utility arrangements and outside agreements were secured. By 2018, those problems had generated more than $600 million in contract changes, with another $1.6 billion anticipated to finish the three construction projects examined.

These were identifiable decisions with foreseeable consequences. Calling everything an unfortunate accident becomes less convincing with every ignored warning.

Who experienced meaningful personal consequences for all this “mismanagement”? 

No one.

Former CEO Jeff Morales departed in 2017. Board chairman Dan Richard left in 2019, after Gov. Jerry Brown reappointed him following the scathing audit. Brian Kelly remained CEO until retiring in 2024.

The public records reviewed do not establish personal repayment orders or criminal punishment for those leaders over these findings. A resignation can end a salary; it does not reimburse taxpayers. Nor does it demonstrate that the next executive will face stronger demands.

That is the incentive problem. Contractors collect payments, consultants bill and officials announce milestones while delivery remains distant. There are surely some capable people working on this project. But institutional rewards have proved far more dependable than institutional consequences.

The latest scandal also makes blanket assurances of innocent incompetence untenable. Improper expenses were documented. Whether broader graft occurred deserves an independent investigation following payments, approvals and relationships. Taxpayers should not have to establish an entire criminal conspiracy before demanding that the spending stop being treated as its own accomplishment.

Consider the price. Today’s approximately $126 billion Phase 1 projection exceeds the early $33 billion estimate by $93 billion, or roughly 282 percent. Against the approximately $45 billion figure associated with the 2008 voter presentation, the increase is $81 billion, or 180 percent.

Those are nominal comparisons, without adjusting for inflation or changing designs. They describe projected completion costs, not money already spent. They remain an extraordinary gulf between the original proposition and today’s outlook.

The authority also estimates approximately $231 billion without its proposed design and scope optimizations. That is a different scenario, not an established final bill. Nevertheless, the lower figure depends on changes whose delivery cannot simply be assumed.

Even initial Central Valley service faces serious uncertainty. The inspector general identified costs and contingency that would increase its reduced-scope estimate from $35.7 billion to approximately $42.3 billion–$45.3 billion. The watchdog also warned of exhausted funding resources as soon as December 2027 without financing.

My assessment gives the promised San Francisco–Los Angeles connection a measly 25 percent chance of operating by 2045. That is a subjective judgment, not a statistical forecast. It expresses deep skepticism grounded in the record, rather than confidence that leadership will suddenly transform itself.

What about 2050? 2057? Neither is a verified completion date. Both illustrate how far “eventually” can drift. Further delays risk additional construction, administration and financing costs. Nobody can responsibly promise that $126 billion is the ceiling.

How many years do California Democrats expect to need to deliver a high-speed rail system? 100?

It’s disgraceful.

Republican critics have a substantial point: theoretical possibility is no justification for indefinite funding. The officials requesting more money must demonstrate a viable delivery plan. “Someone might fix it someday” is not one.

Other nations have built high-speed rail. California has built nothing but excuses. Until funding, contracts and executive authority depend on independently verified delivery, Choudri’s departure changes the personnel far more than the prospects.

(Contributing writer, Brooke Bell)